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This paper models the competitive equilibrium wage rate when employ- 
ment offers vary according to the amount of anticipated unemployment 
and unemployment risk. The competitive wage reflects a compensating 
differential which  includes a  certainty  equivalent  compensation pro- 
portional to the squared expected unemployment rate and a risk com- 
pensation proposal to the coefficient of  unemployment variation. The 
factors of proportionality are half the inverse compensated labor supply 
elasticity and half the relative risk aversion, respectively. We use panel 
data to construct a model of  anticipated unemployment and unemploy- 
ment variance which depends on personal employment history and indus- 
try-wide and economy-wide factors.  Compensating wage differentials 
ranging from less than one percent to more than fourteen percent are 
estimated for a two-digit industry classification over the years 1970-75. 
4.1  Introduction 
The  appropriate  theoretical  framework  for  the  interpretation  of 
measurements of  unemployment is once again a matter of controversy. 
The issues involved are important both because of the overwhelming  role 
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that measured unemployment plays in the discussion of  public policies 
designed to mitigate it and because of the research strategies implied for 
understanding  the causes and consequences of  movements in it. One 
natural research strategy is to interpret unemployment as the equilibrium 
outcome of  a worker's  choices about job search or the intertemporal 
allocation of nonmarket time.' Of course, labor supply theoretic explana- 
tions of movements in unemployment are not complete without further 
specification, but this approach does imply a general strategy for the 
necessary research. An alternative approach is to treat unemployment as 
a constraint on individual behavior rather than a result of  it.*  Although 
this demand theoretic approach is also incomplete without further spec- 
ification, it also implies a general strategy for further research. 
Treating unemployment as a constraint on behavior may appear to 
have immediate normative  implications for public policies regarding 
unemployment  benefits or compensation.  It may  seem plausible that 
workers would, as a group, purchase insurance against an unpredictable 
exogenous constraint on the hours they are able to sell in the market. 
Whether this insurance is provided privately or governmentally would 
seem, then, to be a matter of  form rather than substance. Predictable 
variations in the nature and extent of  the risks of  unemployment are 
surely  extensive, so  that  a  uniform  governmental  insurance  benefit 
scheme would still leave considerable variation in the incidence of unem- 
ployment constraints to be compensated within the labor market. The 
purpose of  this paper is to examine a theoretical model of  market wage 
adjustments to compensate for the uninsured differences in the incidence 
of unemployment. We examine the empirical significance of these com- 
pensations using data from the Panel Study of  Income Dynamics for the 
years  1967 to 1975 (Survey Research  Center  1972ab 1973 1974 1975 
1976). 
Our analysis concerns two different but related issues. First, we extend 
the emerging empirical and theoretical analyses of  the sources of  com- 
pensating wage differentials to include a systematic treatment of  the 
impact of constraints on hours at  Our analysis shows clearly how 
the determination of  wage rates in  the presence  of  fully anticipated 
constraints is systematically related to the determination of labor supply 
in the absence of such constraints, and demonstrates that these two issues 
are connected in a way that has not been fully appreciated in the past. The 
analysis provides a theoretical framework for measuring the impact of 
risky labor supply constraints on the determination of market wages. At 
the same time, our model also provides some evidence of how fruitful a 
research strategy that treats unemployment as a constraint on behavior is 
likely to be.  We find that the labor market compensates anticipated 
layoffs and unemployment by 2-6  percent per year. The estimated com- 
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year to year within industries. Section 4.2 provides a theoretical analysis 
of  equilibrium wage compensations. Section 4.3 disusses the empirical 
methodology and results. 
4.2  A Theoretical Model of Compensating 
Differentials and Employment Constraints 
In this section we consider the determination of wages when workers 
may choose employment in either of  two sectors. In the unconstrained 
sector the worker may choose the optimum labor supply given the pre- 
vailing wage. In the constrained sector the worker accepts a fixed wage 
and employment conditions contract which sets the average number of 
work hours and employment variability. In a competitive equilibrium 
with identical workers, the utility of these two employment situations will 
be equal. This condition is used to characterize the relationship between 
the wage in the constrained sector and the conditions of  employment. 
Specifically, we relate the equilibrium wage to the expected extent of 
unemployment and hours variability. 
In the absence of  a constraint on the hours a worker may sell in the 
market, the usual assumptions about preferences between nonmarket 
time and commodities lead to an optimal offer of  labor supply ho(w,  p,  y) 
and optimal commodity demands of xo(w,  p, y) that depend on the wage 
rate w, commodity prices p,'and nonlabor income y. The indirect or 
maximal utility for this consumer-worker is than V(w,  p,  y) which also 
depends on w,  p,  and y. Consider now a constraint h <  ho(w,  p,  y) which 
prevents the worker from selling more than h hours on the labor market. 
Faced with a binding constraint, the worker will supply h hours of work, 
demand commodities x*(h, p,  wh +  y), and achieve maximal utility of 
V*(h,p,  wh  +y).  For the same w,p,  andy the constraint on hours will, of 
course, lead to a maximal utility V*(h,  p, wh+y) which is less than 
V(w,  p,  y). The constrained worker would then reach a lower utility level 
than would be the case in the unconstrained job. The maximum of  V* 
with respect to h is simply V(w,  p,  y) and is achieved at the point h =  ho. 
V* is graphed in figure 4.1 as a function of  h for given w,  p,  and y. We 
assume V* is concave in the relevant region although this is necessary 
only at the point h =  ho(w,  p,  y). 
If the worker is faced with a choice of a job in the unconstrained sector 
versus a job in the constrained sector at the same wage rate, the worker 
would always prefer  employment in the unconstrained  sector. Labor 
market equilibrium will entail the condition 
(1)  V*G,  P,  w*h +Y) =  V(w,  P,  Y) 
where w is the prevailing wage in the unconstrained sector and w* is the 
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he  h" 
Hours of  Work (ti) 
Sources  of  Compensating  Differentials  Illustrated  Using 
Hours of  Work and Constrained Maximal Utility 
supply of h  Equation 1 defines the proportionate compensating 
wage differential (w*  -  w)/w =  tn(w*lw) implicitly. Figure 4.1 demon- 
strates this idea for the choice between jobs that entail ho and h hours at 
work. The compensating wage differential is simply the increase in the 
wage rate sufficient to eliminate V-  V*(h),  the utility differen~e.~  The 
consumer worker is indifferent between the wage-hours package w,  ho 
and the wage-hours pair w*,  h. Both allow the attaintment of  the same 
utility  Formally, w*  is the solution of  the implicit equation 1  and 
may be written as 
(2)  w*  =  w*(i,  w,  p,  y) 
We  will  discuss some  straightforward  approximations to  equation  2 
below. 
The preceding alalysis supposes that the hours of work constraint h is 
known with certainty. In some situations it may be more realistic to 
assume that h is a random drawing from a distribution of  possible hours 
constraints with expected value h.  The worker must choose between a job 
in the constrained sector which offers the known wage w** and a known 
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with the known combination w,  ho. Labor market equilibrium will then 
require that w**  compensate for the riskiness of  fluctuations in hours 
worked and for the presence of  the mean constraint on hours worked. 
Figure 4.1 also illustrates this point. We have assumed in the figure that 
h =  ho with probability IT, and h =  he with probability 1 -  IT. The probabil- 
ity is chosen such that E[h]  =  h =   IT^' + (1 -  r)he.  Expected utility is then 
E[V*(h)]  =  mV*(h0)  + (1 -  n)V*(he).  The  wage  difference  w**  -  w* 
compensates for the utility difference E[V*(h)]  -  V*(h),  which is the 
incremental utility loss associated with the addition of risk to the model 
with only a mean constraint. As usual, the sign of  the compensating 
differential depends on the worker's attitude toward risk. The case of risk 
aversion, represented by the concavity of the function V*(h)  in figure 4.1 
implies that additional risk adds to the compensating wage differential 
w**  -  w*.  This may be seen by noticing that a mean preserving decrease 
in he would lead to greater variance in hours, a greater (absolute) differ- 
ence in E[V*(h)]  -  V*(h),  and a greater compensating wage differential. 
The concavity of the function V*(h)  is guaranteed in the neighborhood of 
h=ho so  that for small deviations of  h from  ho, increased risk  will 
generally imply an increased compensating wage differential. 
In general, labor market equilibrium will now require that 
(3)  V**(w**,  p,  y;  6) = V*(h,  p,  w*h  +y) 
where  V**=JV*(h,  p,  w**h+y)f(h;  6)  dh  is expected utility and 8 
represents the parameters of  the density function for hours of  work 
offered. Equation 3 defines w**  implicitly as 
(4) 
which is the wage rate which must accompany an employment contract 
which offers expected constraints and uncertain employment. 
The representation of  a simplified unemployment insurance (UI) sys- 
tem does not add any major complications. We use the simple specifica- 
tion that the UI system replaces a fixed proportion y of  lost earnings. 
Labor income is, then, w**_lh  +  y(ho -  h)].  The number of hours actually 
compensated is h +  y(ho -  h), which we call effective hours.' Equilibrium 
condition 1 is replaced by 
w**  =  w**(w*,  p,  y;  6) 
(1')  V*(h,p,  w*[h+y(hO-h)]+y)=V(w,p,  y) 
Effective hours, and not actual hours, enter the relevant budget con- 
straint. It should be noted that we used ho  which depends on wand not w* 
as the hours base for calculating lost earnings. The relevant comparison 
for determining the opportunity cost of  the layoff or hours reduction is 
with the labor supply in the unconstrained sector. The wage w  is the only 
wage at which the worker  can optimize hours of  work directly. The 
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strained job equal to the utility level provided by ho(w,  p,  y).  The utility 
level provided by ho(  w* ,  p,  y)  is irrelevant since no worker can achieve it. 
Condition 1' introduces an important new twist into the analysis. De- 
pending on the values of y and ho -  h,  it is possible for w* to be less than 
w.  This occurs whenever the utility payment for the UI benefits exceeds 
the utility loss from being required to consume too much leisure. The 
nature of this tradeoff is clear from the approximations below. When the 
hours offer h is a random variable with mean h in the insured sector, the 
equilibrium condition 3 becomes 
(3')  vy**(w**,p,y;  e)=v*(h,p,  w*[h+y(h0-h)]+y) 
The compensating wage differentials defined implicitly by (1') and (3') 
will, of  course, depend on y as well as the wage, price, nonlabor income 
triple w,  p,  y,  and the 8 parametema 
We now address the problem of deriving useful approximations to the 
compensations expressed in equations 2 and 4.  The results reveal that the 
parameters of  the approximations have familiar interpretations which 
relate to conventional labor supply and risk analysis. We combine the 
approximations to form an estimating equation for the wage-generating 
function for a panel of  continuously employed (or temporarily laid off) 
workers. 
Let U(x,  1 -  h) be a strictly quasiconcave, twice continuously differen- 
tiable utility function, and let px  =  wh  +  y be the budget constraint. It is 
convenientg  to work with the minimum expenditure function R(w,p,  v), 
defined as 
R(w,  p,  v)  =  min px -  wh 
Ix, hl  (5) 
subject to v =  U(x,  1 -  h) and 0 <  h <  1. In the absence of unemployment 
insurance  the minimum expenditure function for  an individual con- 
strained by h =  h with certainty is given by 
~*(h,  p,  v) -  wh =  min px -  wh 
R*(h,  p,  v) -  w*h =  R(w,  p,  v) 
{XI  (6) 
subject to v = U(x, 1 -  h). Equilibrium condition 1  is equivalent to 
(7) 
Expanding the left-hand side of (7) around the point h =  hC(w,  p,  v), the 
compensated labor supply function, yields the second order approxima- 
tion 
w* -  w  1 1 [h-hO(w, p,  y)I2  -  =-- 
w  2e  hho(w,p,y)  (8) 
where  e is defined as the compensated labor supply elasticity for the 
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ly proportional to the squared expected unemployment rate u =  (ho -  h)/ 
ho. The factor of  proportionality is half the inverse compensated labor 
supply elasticity. The more inelastic the compensated labor supply sched- 
ule, the greater the compensating differential will  be for anticipated 
underemployment or anticipated spells of unemployment. The formula is 
symmetric. It also determines the overtime premium  for  anticipated 
overemployment although equation 8 expresses the overtime premium as 
if  it applied to the average rather than the marginal wage rate. 
Next consider the introduction of a UI system which pays benefits as y 
percent of  lost earnings w*(ho  -  h). Replacing constrained hours h by 
effective hours in the budget  constraint  implies that the constrained 
minimum expenditure function is 
RY'(h,  p,  V) -  ~{h  +  y[h"(w,  p,  V)  -A]] 
subject to v+ U(x, 1 -  &).lo  Replacing R* in equation 7 with Ry*  and 
expanding the left-hand side around h =  h"  yields, to second order, 
where  hO=ho(w,  p, y). The presence  of  the  UI  benefits causes the 
compensating differential to fall in proportion to  the expected unemploy- 
ment rate. The factor of proportionality is exactly the UI system replace- 
ment rate. Equation 8' shows explicitly the tradeoff between UI benefits 
and the labor supply compensation. The function describing the compen- 
sating differential is approximately quadratic in the expected unemploy- 
ment rate. For small expected unemployment rates the compensating 
differential is negative. As the expected unemployment rate increases, 
the compensating differential falls to a (negative) minimum and then 
increases. The unemployment rate corresponding to the minimum com- 
pensating differential and the rate corresponding to a zero compensating 
differential depend on the values of y and e as well as on the optimal and 
constrained labor supplies. Because (8') is approximately quadratic in the 
expected unemployment rate, however, the basic dependence is on the 
product ye. It is approximately true that the minimum differential occurs 
at the unemployment rate u =  ye and the two zero compensating differen- 
tials occur at unemployment rates of  zero and ye." These three points 
determine the quadratic approximation. 
If  the labor supply constraint  h is drawn from a distribution with 
E[h]  =  h and Var[h]  = 2 then, in the absence of  UI insurance, equilib- 
rium condition 3 can be expanded in a Taylor series around h to yield the 
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(9) 
where r is the relative risk aversion function when h is the sole source of 
randomness in V*  .I2 Equation 9 implies that the incremental compensat- 
ing differential implied by positive hours variance is approximately pro- 
portional to the squared coefficient of  variation in hours of  work. The 
factor of proportionality is half the relative risk aversion, r,  which must be 
positive,  at least when h  is near ho. When  a UI system is in  effect, 
equation 9 is modified to be 
(9') 
w**  -  w*-  1  2  _- 
w*  2  &[h  +  Y(h0 -  h)] 
where ho is evaluated at ho(w,  p,  y) as in (8') above. 
Although we apply the approximations 8 and 9 to individual data using 
individual unemployment rates, the theory has some implications for the 
use of aggregate unemployment rates in wage determination equations as 
well. Two points should be remembered. First, the error in hours of 
work, h -  h,  is not a determinant of the compensating differential. Conse- 
quently, the  individual's realized unemployment rate is not relevant; only 
the predictable component ho -  h affects the wage. Using the aggregate 
unemployment rate in the individual's wage determination equation is 
justified only if  this variable is the appropriate expected unemployment 
rate for the individual. Second, the use of  the squared aggregate unem- 
ployment rate confounds two effects. The coefficient on the squared 
expected unemployment rate measures the inverse labor supply elas- 
ticity,  while  the coefficient on the expected  squared error  (squared 
coefficient of  variation) measures the risk  compensation.  Unless the 
aggregate unemployment rate is decomposed into predicted and error 
components, these effects will be confounded. 
The approximations in equations 8' and 9' make clear the relationship 
between our model and labor supply decisions when layoffs are correctly 
anticipated. Workers may enter into explicit contracts such as collective 
bargaining agreements or implicit contracts with particular employers in 
order to secure employment in the constrained  sector. A temporary 
layoff is one tool which the employer may use to make the expected 
constraint a realized constraint. If temporary layoffs were the only form 
of  hours reduction that an employer used, then the key parameters 8 in 
the distribution of  h would be the layoff probability 7~;  the conditional 
expected  completed  duration  given  a  layoff  6; and  the  conditional 
variance of  the layoff  duration  (b2.  The implied compensating wage 
differential is 149  Unemployment,  Layoffs, and Wage Differentials 
w**  -  -11  T2S2  --  +--  w- 
ho +  (y -  ~)as  2 e ho[ho  +  (y -  ~)as]  -y 
W 
(10) 
1  a[(l-a)S2++2] 
2 (h0-a6)[h0+(y-l)aS] 
+-r 
Equation 10 forms the basis of  our empirical analysis. It shows clearly 
that the theoretical constructs-expected constrained hours and hours 
variance-may  be replaced with the parameters of  the layoff structure 
associated with the job. The probability of  temporary layoff, the con- 
ditional mean layoff duration, and conditional duration variance are all 
observable characteristics of  a given job, in principle. Consequently, 
equation 10 implies that t(w**lw>  can be specified in terms of  employ- 
ment conditions that are identifiable in many survey data sets. In addi- 
tion, this formulation does not require a priori determination of  which 
workers are employed in constrained labor supply situations. As the 
probability of  experiencing a layoff approaches zero, the compensating 
differential also approaches zero. Hence, the layoff probability for every 
worker can be used as a continuous indicator of the extent to which labor 
supply constraints are an important aspect of  the worker's job. 
In  this section  we have  shown that  the appropriate compensating 
differential  for employment  situations involving anticipated  spells of 
unemployment can be expressed in terms of familiar labor supply param- 
eters. The job-specific variables affecting the size of the differential can 
be expressed in terms of  quantifiable properties of  the layoff incidence 
and layoff duration characteristics of  the job. In the next section we 
calculate empirical analogues of  these variables and estimate the com- 
pensating wage differentials. 
4.3  Empirical Analysis of Compensating Wage Differentials 
The wage function in equation 10 holds at the market level under the 
assumptions of section 4.2. Specifically, given data on individual oppor- 
tunity  wages  w,  expected  unemployment  a8, and  unemployment 
variance a[(l -  IT)  S2 +  +2],  we could estimate the parameters y,  e, and r 
directly from (10). There are no genuine issues of simultaneous deter- 
mination as long as unobserved individual heterogeneity is confined to 
opportunity wages, unemployment incidence, and layoff duration.  l3 The 
common  utility function parameters e and r  will  still determine the 
market-equilibrium-compensating  differential.  On the other hand, if 
individuals vary substantially in either the value of  the compensated labor 
supply elasticity or the relative risk aversion parameter, the market will 
induce a sort in which firms are matched with employees who supply the 150  John M. Abowd and Orley Ashenfelter 
appropriate constrained hours and hours variance at minimum cost to the 
firm. For example, if  e varies over the population while r does not, then 
individuals with the highest e will be sorted into the firms which use 
temporary layoffs the most-large  7~6.  This combination provides the 
firm with its demanded employment flexibility at the lowest cost. Indi- 
viduals with small e, however, are sorted into jobs with small expected 
unemployment, since these individuals require the largest compensating 
differentials. If  the distribution of  e is known, then, in principle, the 
market sorting of  individuals into jobs according to n8  can be inferred 
directly. In practice, these equilibria are difficult to generate and analyze 
except in the simplest of cases.I4  We will confine our analysis to the model 
in which all workers share a common y, e, and r but may differ systemati- 
cally and permanently according to w,  n, 6, and +2.  That is, we will allow 
personal heterogeneity in the opportunity wages and job characteristics 
but not in the utility function. This preserves equation 10 as an opera- 
tional form of  the equilibrium without requiring that all individuals be 
observationally identical, given observed characteristics. 
Panel data permit us to construct measures of the probability of layoff 
and layoff duration parameters which control for the individual’s per- 
sonal characteristics, past layoff durations, industry-specific  past layoff 
durations, and economy-wide layoff histories. Although this information 
is probably inferior to the individual’s  own information, there is no doubt 
that controlling for personal history differences gives a substantially more 
accurate measure of the individual’s employment situaton than we could 
get from annual survey averages produced separately for different indus- 
tries and occupations. As in other empirical analyses of  expectational 
equilibria, our task is to identify the consistent patterns in the employer’s 
behavior and estimate the relationship between these forecastable ac- 
tions and the market wage. We do observe that there are permanent 
differences across industries in the extent and duration of  layoffs; how- 
ever, there is also substantial  intraindustry  variability which  reflects 
firm-specific and individual-specific differences in  employment condi- 
tions. Our method of  constructing n, 6, and +* will  capture these em- 
ployer and individual components as well as industry-specific  and econ- 
omy wide differences in the unemployment expectations of the workers. 
Formally, let di,  be the duration of  unemployment for individual i in 
year t. Let zit  be the individual’s  employment history and personal charac- 
teristics up to year t, including di, -  di,  -  2, di,  -  and economy histories. 
Consider the two equation systems for the latent variables ylif  and y2iI: 
where 42  X 1) 
all i and t, and 
event 
Y2it +  z;,  P2 +  &Zit 
is distributed N(0,  Z) independently and identically for 
p1 and p2 are unknown parameter vectors. Define the 151  Unemployment, Layoffs, and Wage Differentials 
1 if  i is laid off  in year t 
(12) 
We use equation system 11 along with the following sample selection 
rules to determine the individual’s employment-specific layoff param- 
eters 
tit = {  0 otherwise 
and 
1  if  yzit  >  0 
tit= {  0 otherwise 
Following Heckman (1979), the selection rules 13 and 14 imply that 
(15)  rit  =  Pr{tit  = 1) =J  f(s)ds 
a 




TifSif  E[di,  I zit] =  nit(Z$1+  FYiJ  (16) 
and 
where f(s)  is the standard normal density, F(s) is the cumulative normal 
distribution function, and 
Equation 15  models rir  as a probit function given the history contained in 
zit.  Equation 16 defines the unconditional mean duration as the expecta- 
tion of the conditional mean durations Sit and zero. Equation 17 defines 
the conditional variance I$;[.  We use these quantities to form the uncon- 
ditional variance rif[(l  -  nit)  Sz  +  $21.  The statistical model of equations 
15-17  provides an empirical counterpart to each of  the required theo- 
retical employment condition measures. We turn next to the estimation 
of  the parameters of  the layoff duration model and the compensating 
differentials. 
4.3.1  The Data 
Estimates are based on waves  1-9  of  The Panel  Study  of  Income 
Dynamics, (PSID) corresponding to calendar years 1967-75  .I5  Only the 
3,318 households in the wave 9 release of  the probability sample were 
eligible for inclusion in the estimation sample. Since we used three years 
of  employment history to calculate the unemployment measures, esti- 152  John M. Abowd and Orley Ashenfelter 
mated differentials cover the period from 1970 (wave 4) to 1975 (wave 9). 
In order to be included  in  a particular  year’s estimation  sample, an 
observation was required to come from a household with a white male 
head who was interviewed in the employed battery in the current year 
and each of the three previous years. This last requirement means that an 
individual must have been employed or temporarily laid off  at the time of 
the interview (usually March of the following year) for four consecutive 
years. The unemployed battery is given to individuals who have experi- 
enced a prolonged layoff or who are unemployed and do not anticipate 
returning to their previous jobs. This selection rule, although primarily 
dictated by data availability considerations, results in an analysis sample 
of  very stably employed individuals. On  average, the sampled individuals 
have twenty-four years of  labor force experience and over nine years of 
employer tenure. We are not concerned here with extending our conclu- 
sions to a population of  less stably employed individuals such as youths or 
females.  Rather, we  realize  that our conclusions  apply  primarily  to 
individuals who have made relatively long-term employment commit- 
ments in industries and occupations which display substantial differences 
in short-term unemployment and temporary layoff patterns. 
About forty percent of  the 3,318 cases qualify for inclusion in any one 
year’s estimation sample. Changes in the head of  household and failure of 
the requirement of  four consecutive interviews in the employed battery 
were about equally responsible for deletions. Experienced users of  the 
PSID data will recognize that samples of  1,200-1,300 are common when 
continuous histories of  individuals (as opposed to households) are drawn 
from the probability sample. Table 4.A.  1  presents definitions and annual 
summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis. 
4.3.2  Extimation and Measurement of  the Unemployment Variables 
The basic unemployment variable used in our analysis is  DSCRP,.,, 
which is defined as the number of  hours individual i spent unemployed in 
year t.I6 Hours unemployed are measured as the product of  days spent 
unemployed,  or on strike, times the average hours worked per week 
when employed regularly. The variable DUNEMi, is defined as one when 
DSCRP >  0 and zero otherwise. Table 4.1 presents the results of  estimat- 
ing  a probit  equation for DUNEM (column  1) and a selection-bias- 
corrected conditional expectation equation for DSCRP (column 2), given 
that layoff duration is positive. 
The probit equation in column 1  of table 4.1 measures the effect of  the 
individual’s employment history on vir.  The determinants of  nit  are the 
individual’s  history  of  layoff  durations  for  the  past  three  years 
(DSCRPMl-DSCRPM3),  the industry-specific average layoff durations 
for the past three years (MDSCRPMl-MDSCRPM3),  and the economy- Table 4.1  Estimates of the Parameters of the Layoff Probability and 
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Table 4.1 (continued) 
DUNEM"  DSCRP~ 
(Probit)  (Lambda) 
Variable  (1)  (2) 
RZ 
S. E. equation 
en likelihood 









#Estimated by maximum likelihood. Equation also includes industry dummy variables. 
bEstimated  by OLS. Equation also includes industry dummy variables. The reported S. E. 
equation and R2  have been corrected. 
wide  average  layoff  durations  for  the  same  period  (YDSCRPM1- 
YDSCRPM3). Permanent interindustry differences are captured by a set 
of  fifteen industry dummy variables. Personal characteristics are mea- 
sured  by  schooling dummy variables  (relative  to  college graduates) 
(SCHCLASl-SCHCLAS3),  total  labor  force  experience  (EXPERI- 
ENCE, EXPERIENCE2), and total time spent with the same employer 
(TENURE, TENURE2). Although the determinants of rit  are not the 
major concern of this analysis, it is worth noting that personal unemploy- 
ment history is an important predictor of  current unemployment prob- 
ability, even when industry average durations and economy-wide dura- 
tions have been held constant. We interpret this effect as measuring 
employer  and  individual  elements  of  the  employment contract.  No 
attempt is made to separate the employer-specific effect from the indi- 
vidual-specific effect since we remove a person effect from the wage 
equation used later in the analysis. The effects of common influences on 
all employers in a given industry are captured by the industry-specific 
variables. These allow both permanent and serially correlated transitory 
effects of unemployment history to influence predicted layoff probabili- 
ties. It is interesting to note that lagged industry layoff durations decrease 
the probability of a current layoff, given the industry dummy variables. 
This indicates that workers (and employers) expect unemployment to 
undershoot the long-term average after an exceptionally bad year and to 
overshoot the long-term average after an exceptionally good year. Econ- 
omy-wide influences are mixed and rather imprecisely estimated. Per- 
sonal  characteristics  have  reasonable  effects.  High  school  dropouts 
(SCHCLAS1) are the most like to suffer layoffs, followed by high school 
graduates (SCHCLAS2), college dropouts (SCHCLAS3) and college 
graduates. Increases in employment tenure substantially reduce layoff 
probabilities (at a decreasing rate); lifetime labor force experience has a 
weak negative effect on layoffs (also at a decreasing rate). 155  Unemployment, Layoffs, and Wage Differentials 
Column 2 of  table 4.1 shows the selection-bias-corrected  estimates of 
the conditional duration equation. The pattern of effects is similar to the 
layoff probability equation, but no assessment of  statistical significance 
can be made from the least-squares estimates. The implied intereauation 
correlation coefficient is a12/G=  .43. Under the null hypothesis of 
a12=0, the standard  error of  the coefficient on LAMBDA is  .181. 
Although the hypothesis that u12  =  0 cannot be rejected at conventional 
significance  levels, we do not want to ignore a sample correlation of  .43; 
hence, we maintain the selection bias correction when calculating  Sit and 
Table 4.2  provides a comprehensive summary of observed layoff inci- 
dence and duration as well as the layoff incidence, expected duration, 
and duration variance implied by the equations in table 4.1. Table 4.2 
reveals the substantial and relatively permanent interindustry differences 
in the use of  temporary layoffs as a means of  reducing work hours for 
long-term  employees.”  The row  labeled  DUNEM  shows the  actual 
annual average  layoff  frequency for each  industry. The row  labeled 
FDUNEM is the predicted layoff probability mi,, based on table 4.1.  The 
DSCRP row shows the average layoff duration in thousands of hours.18 
The row EXPDURAT  shows the expected layoff duration aj&,  based on 
table 4.1.  The unconditional variance based on table 4.1 is shown in the 
row VARDURAT. Durable manufacturing industries (30-33)  and the 
construction  industry  (51) have the highest layoff  incidences and ex- 
pected durations. Nondurable manufacturing (40, 45) also shows sub- 
stantial use  of  layoff  unemployment.  These same  industries  exhibit 
higher unemployment risk (measured by VARDURAT) al~0.l~  Govern- 
ment (92) and professional service industries (86, 87) use layoff unem- 
ployment relatively little. Overall, 1975 was the year with the highest 
predicted unconditional unemployment duration (47 hours) and the high- 
est observed unconditional unemployment duration (64 hours). The year 
1971 had the largest overprediction (10 hours) while 1975 had the largest 
underprediction  (- 17 hours). 
4.3.3 
The empirical counterparts of the variables in equation 10 were defined 
using the predicted probabilities, durations, and variances estimated in 
table 4.1  and summarized in table 4.2.  We used reported hours (HACTi,) 
plus unemployed  hours  (DSCRPJ  as our measure  of  desired  hours 
(HOPTi,). The empirical counterparts of  the expressions in (10) are: 
4&. 
Estimation of  the Wage Equation 
(18)  HEFF(7)  ho + (y -  l)& =  HOPT,, 
+ (7 -  l)EXPDURATi, 
-7Fs  -  - -  EXPDURAT,,  CERTEG(y), = 
ho + (y -  l)d  HEFF(y)i, Table 4.2  Unemployment, Expected Unemployment, and Compensating Merentid Measures for Annual Industry Aggregates 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975 
1. DSCRP  .0017  .0558  .0235  .0402  ,0802  ,0595 
EXPDURAT  ,0325  .0532  .0327  .0455  ,0496  .0567 
VARDURAT  .0184  .0309  ,0152  ,0217  .0240  ,0318 
DUNEM  .0203  .1194  ,0458  .0685  .1473  ,1429 
FDUNEM  .0910  ,1079  ,0705  .0906  ,1114  ,1160 
Comp. Diff.  2.564  5.205  6.779  7.469  4.888  4.441 
(Std. Error)  (.430)  (.961)  (1.592)  (2.232)  (1.072)  (315) 
30.  DSCRP  .0095  .0522  .0638  .0278  ,0596  .0573 
EXPDURAT  .0332  ,0537  .0208  .0442  ,0501  ,0394 
VARDURAT  ,0183  .0288  ,0121  ,0209  ,0214  .0198 
DUNEM  .1207  .1429  ,2143  .0943  .2076  ,1818 
FDUNEM  ,1320  ,1539  ,0963  ,1337  ,1475  ,1428 
Comp. Diff.  3.968  4.792  2.087  4.878  4.881  3.859 
(Std. Error)  (.681)  (.846)  (.349)  (1.130)  (1.130)  (.721) 
31.  DSCRP  .0097  ,0375  ,0149  ,0267  .0117  .0593 
EXPDURAT  .0204  .0355  ,0166  ,0307  ,0349  .0329 
VARDURAT  .0117  .0196  .0092  .0142  ,0186  .0179 
DUNEM  .0435  ,0769  ,0864  ,0648  ,0865  ,1628 
FDUNEM  .0859  ,0999  ,0624  .0891  ,1045  ,0965 
Comp. Diff.  1.860  2.977  1.748  3.454  3.260  4.871 
(Std. Error)  (.311)  (S07)  (.308)  (314)  (.584)  (.915) 
32.  DSCRP  .2073  ,0747  .0360  .0584  .lo62  .1292 
EXPDURAT  .0909  ,0744  .Mi69  ,0615  ,1177  .1118 
VARDURAT  .0439  ,0317  ,0310  ,0315  .0538  .0468 
DUNEM  ,4456  .2410  .1714  ,3000  ,4407  ,3529 
FDUNEM  ,2851  ,2262  .1795  .2511  .3388  .2853 
Comp. Diff.  8.450  8.101  5.992  7.047  14.011  10.281 
(Std. Error)  (1.621)  (1.933)  (1.288)  (1.313)  (2.744)  (2.317) 
1970  1971  1792  1973  1974  1975 
55.  DSCRP  .0758  .0558  ,0517  .0436  ,0604  ,0456 
EXPDURAT  .0364  .0588  ,0265  ,0407  ,0576  ,0653 
VARDURAT  .0211  .0298  .0148  ,0205  ,0278  .0286 
DUNEM  ,3239  .2727  .1312  ,1129  .2121  .1667 
FDUNEM  .1725  ,2001  ,1171  ,1685  ,2079  ,1967 
Comp. Diff.  2.865  4.233  3.492  3.746  5.372  5.820 
(Std. Error)  (S07)  (.783)  (.678)  (.787)  (1.125)  (1.386) 
57. DSCRP  ,0050  ,0395  ,0088  ,0025  .0075  ,0383 
EXPDURAT  ,0126  .0219  .0167  ,0226  ,0190  .0224 
VARDURAT  ,0079  ,0124  ,0065  ,0120  .0112  .0126 
DUNEM  ,0862  ,1452  ,0400  .0208  .0417  .0208 
FDUNEM  .0661  .0761  .0520  .0700  ,0811  .0800 
Comp. Diff.  1.354  1.992  1.818  2.215  1.786  1.908 
(Std. Error)  (.221)  (.329)  (S10)  (.458)  (.303)  (.318) 
61. DSCRP  ,0133  ,0159  ,0149  ,0128  ,0242  .0309 
EXPDURAT  ,0153  .0252  .0113  ,0205  ,0258  ,0318 
VARDURAT  .0090  ,0140  ,0066  .0112  ,0141  ,0158 
DUNEM  .0674  ,0315  ,0516  .0446  ,0828  ,0898 
FDUNEM  .0678  ,0802  ,0504  .0753  ,0874  ,0896 
Comp. Diff.  1.672  2.042  312  2.433  2.026  2.625 
(Std. Error)  (.287)  (.343)  (.134)  (.451)  (.344)  (S11) 
81.  DSCRP  ,0107  .oooO  .0057  .0413  ,0248  .0637 
EXPDURAT  .0180  .0288  .0117  ,0231  ,0257  ,0376 
VARDURAT  .0103  ,0161  ,0068  .0129  ,0142  ,0163 
DUNEM  ,0333  .oooO  ,0286  ,1316  .0811  ,1471 
FDUNEM  .0691  ,0843  .0493  ,0774  .0853  .0870 
Comp. Diff.  1.327  2.075  ,964  2.094  2.200  3.337 
(Std. Error)  (.218)  (.348)  (.158)  (.348)  (.370)  (.786) Table 4.2 (continued) 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975 




























,0161  ,0329  .0097  ,0197  ,0374  ,0782 
.0191  ,0351  .0166  ,0286  .0357  .0354 
.0112  ,0179  .0087  .0158  ,0177  .0187 
,0870  .1154  .0571  .0308  .1967  ,1667 
.0852  .lo56  ,0702  .0990  .1165  ,1086 
1.964  3.134  1.450  2.519  3.120  3.381 
(.327)  (.591)  (.268)  (.435)  (.637)  (.616) 
,0095  .0176  ,0034  .0241  .0117  .0310 
.0093  .0220  .0055  .0127  .OM7  .0225 
.0104  .0143  .OW0  .0111  .0138  .0146 
.0588  .2051  ,1290  .1667  ,1250  .lo26 
.1121  .1256  .0766  .1151  .1378  .1291 
1.509  2.438  1.151  1.879  2.269  4.330 
(.245)  (.403)  (.187)  (.306)  (.398)  (.804) 
.0399  .OW  .0049  .0351  .OM5  ,1261 
.0372  .0367  .0258  ,0429  .0580  ,0562 
.0205  .0196  ,0143  ,0189  .0234  .0244 
,2118  .0488  .0241  ,1333  ,1487  ,2647 
,1326  .1186  ,0893  ,1296  .1459  .1423 
3.330  3.607  2.150  4.052  6.019  6.305 
(33) (.626)  (.364)  (1.057)  (1.683)  (1.569) 
.1226  .0427  .0411  ,0574  ,1072  ,1982 
.0604  .0835  .0537  ,0725  .0938  ,1006 
,0257  ,0348  ,0255  ,0317  .04M  .0450 
.2761  .1667  .1683  ,1682  .2789  ,4078 
.1781  .2095  .1594  .2061  .2360  .2356 
5.824  9.277  5.721  7.065  10.645  10.673 
(1.379)  (2.310)  (1.226)  (1.613)  (2.619)  (2.437) 
1970  1971  1972  1973 
85. DSCRP  ,0162  ,0047  ,0177  ,0204 
EXPDURAT  ,0167  ,0340  .0153  ,0230 
VARDURAT  ,0095  ,0150  ,0086  ,0128 
DUNEM  .0676  .0333  ,0769  ,0526 
FDUNEM  ,0653  ,0794  ,0519  ,0759 
Comp. Diff.  1.801  3.854  1.635  1.925 
(Std. Error)  (.299)  (372)  (.285)  (.323) 
86. DSCRP  ,0119  .oooO  .0025  .oooO 
EXPDURAT  .0120  .0204  ,0119  ,0145 
VARDURAT  ,0072  .0114  ,0063  ,0084 
DUNEM  ,0351  .oooO  ,0208  .oooO 
FDUNEM  ,0559  ,0646  ,0408  ,0613 
Comp. Diff.  1.303  1.817  1.382  1.170 
(Std. Error)  (.213)  (.302)  (.279)  (.194) 
87. DSCRP  ,0011  ,0189  .0006  .0002 
EXPDURAT  .0104  .0219  .0070  .0155 
VARDURAT  .0074  ,0122  ,0053  ,0095 
DUNEM  ,0230  .0460  .0116  ,0130 
FDUNEM  ,0697  ,0812  .0503  ,0792 
Comp. Diff.  1.351  2.049  .944  1.473 
(Std. Error)  (.227)  (.347)  (.155)  (.241) 
92.  DSCRP  ,0176  ,0022  ,0252  .0176 
EXPDURAT  .0160  .0197  .0116  .0160 
VARDURAT  ,0081  ,0109  ,0057  ,0084 
DUNEM  .0652  .0274  .0225  ,0538 
FDUNEM  .0502  ,0564  ,0346  ,0529 
Comp. Diff.  1.862  1.627  3.797  1.509 
(Std. Error)  (.377)  (.274)  (.921)  (.266) 
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.  5Tr2S2 
hO[hO + (y -  l)lTS] 
CERTSQG(Y)~,  = 
-  -  .5 (EXPDURAT,,)~  - 
HOPT,, HEFF(y)i, 
.5l~[(l-~)6~++~  COEFVSQG(y)i, = 
(hO-TrS)[hO+ (y- l)lTS] 
-  .5 VARDURATj,  - 
(HOPTj, -  EXPDURATj,)HEFF(y)j, 
From the definitions in equations 18-21  it is clear that there is a nonlinear 
dependence on y (the UI replacement rate) in all three of the expressions 
which enter the equation for tn(w**).  We deal with this problem in two 
different ways. First, we estimate y along with e, r,  and the determinants 
of  &(w) by nonlinear methods. Second, we compute the sample average 
UI replacement rates by industry for each year (MCOMPRAT,.,)  and use 
these replacement  rates instead of  y in  the formation of  the effective 
hours variable HEFF(y)  .20 
Table 4.3 reports the results of  direct estimation of  y, e, and r by 
nonlinear least squares. Columns 1 and 2 report the use of  the reported 
hourly wage &(WAGE) as the dependent variable and columns 3 and 4 
use  the calculated  hourly wage tn(EARNIHACT) as the dependent 
variable. We use as variables determining the opportunity wage-last 
year's wage (LAGW)-collective  bargaining status (UNION), school- 
ing, labor force experience, tenure, region, and year.*l  Columns 1  and 3 
show the results from the specification implied by equation 10. Columns 2 
and 4 show the results from the specifications  implied by equation 10 but 
allowing unanticipated unemployment (UNANTIC) expressed as a per- 
centage of  desired hours to enter the equation.22  The first three rows of 
table 4.3 show the implied estimates of  y, l/e, and r. The row labeled 
shows the implied estimate of  e using Zellner's (1978) method.23 
The row labeled average compensating differential shows the percentage 
compensating differential gross of  the implicit UI purchase payment. 
In general, the results of  columns 1 and 2 are quite favorable to our 
model.  The  implied  ninety  percent  confidence interval  estimate  of 
.093 & .085 for labor supply elasticity is rather imprecise but certainly 
consistent with previously reported values for white males in both magni- 
tude and precision of estimation." The estimated y is too large to be a UI 
replacement rate; however, we will discuss this problem in more detail 
below. The estimated relative risk aversion of  14.048 (?  3.714) reveals 
substantial distaste  for unemployment  risk.  This  result  supports the 
hypothesis that the difference in risk aversion between employees and 
employers results in a demand for implicit labor contracts of  the type 159  Unemployment,  Layoffs, and Wage Differentials 
developed here.25  Overall, the compensating differential is 3.82 percent 
(*  1.26%) which is not an unreasonably large price for employers to pay 
for the right to set TT,  6, and +2. Of this differential, .60 percent (? 3%) 
Table 4.3  Nonlinear Least-Squares Estimates of Wage Parameters under 
Alternative Specifications (Standard errors in parentheses) 
en  en  en  en 
Variable Parameter  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
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"Regressions include annual regional dummy variables. 
This variable is defined as the negative of the theoretical variable so that its coefficient  is y 
and not -y. 
'Computed at the sample averages of CERTSQG and COEFVSQG,  .00074 and .002293, 
respectively. 160  John M. Abowd and Orley Ashenfelter 
is attributable to the certainty equivalent compensation arising from the 
mean  constraint,  while  3.22 percent  (?  .85%)  is  attributable  to risk 
compensation arising from the variability of  unemployment, given the 
mean constraint. The addition of  the unanticipated part of  unemploy- 
ment to the equation (UNANTIC) has no effect on the results. 
The rows labeled Comp. Diff. and (Std. Error) in table 4.2 show the 
industry  by  year-estimated compensating  differentials  and associated 
standard error implied by column 1  of table 4.3. The reported compensat- 
ing differentials are gross of the implicit payment for UI. The interindus- 
try patterns reveal that automobile workers (32) received compensating 
differentials varying from 6.00 percent (1972) to 14.01 percent (1974) of 
hourly wages in exchange for bearing the mean constraints and employ- 
ment risks discussed above. Construction workers (51) received compen- 
sating differentials ranging from 5.72 percent  (1972) to 10.67 percent 
(1975). Workers in the  public sector (92), however, received substantially 
smaller compensations ranging from 1.51 percent (1973) to 5.18 percent 
(1974). Other interindustry and time series comparisons are  obvious from 
the results reported in table 4.2. 
The results in table 4.3, columns 3 and 4, show that the parameter 
estimates are sensitive to the choice of dependent variable. The general 
pattern of  results  remains  the same except for two points. First, the 
estimated effects are larger when calculated wage rates are used. The 
implied  average  compensating  differential  becomes  7.00  percent 
(2  1.64%). Second, the addition of  unanticipated unemployment to the 
equation using calculated wages as the dependent variable (column 4) 
does produce a substantial effect of  .241 (? .097). This suggests that 
directly measured wage rates (WAGE) are probably more reliable mea- 
sures of  the hourly compensation relevant to implicit or explicit labor 
contracts than are the ex post calculated wage rates. 
Table 4.4 reports estimates based on our second solution to the non- 
linear dependence on y. The compensating differential variables have 
been calculated using the observed industry average values of UI replace- 
ment rates (MCOMPRAT) reported in table 4.A.1. Using these vari- 
ables we  can  remove  a  person-specific  effect  from each  individual’s 
opportunity  wage  by  standard  fixed  effect  methods.  The results  are 
presented in columns 1  and 2 for reported wages and columns 3 and 4 for 
calculated wages. Once again, the results for reported wages are highly 
supportive of  the model. The estimated labor supply elasticity is .224 
(? .729), which is more imprecise than the result in table 4.3 but still 
consistent with the previous estimates. The estimated risk aversion pa- 
rameter, 8.982 (?  1.828), is smaller in the fixed effect model. The esti- 
mated UI replacement rate 9 = 1.206 (5.681) now includes reasonable 
values in its ninety percent confidence interval. The average compensat- 
ing differential is 2.14 percent (?  .55%), which is smaller than the values 161  Unemployment, Layoffs,  and Wage Differentials 
Table 4.4  Fixed Effect Estimates of the Compensating Differential Parameters 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
en  en  en  en 
Variable Parameter  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
(WAGE)"  (WAGE)"  (EARNIHACT)"  (EARNMACT)" 
CERTEQG~ y 
CERTSQG Ne 





























































'Regressions  include all variables in table 4.3. 
"This variable is defined as the negative of  the theoretical variable so that its coefficient is y 
and not  -7. 
'Computed as in footnote c, table 4.3. 
Toefficient of  CERTSQG has the wrong sign. 
in table 4.3. Finally, the addition of  UNANTIC has a larger effect in 
column 2 than the comparable effect in table 4.3, column 2, but the effect 
is  imprecisely estimated-.083  (2  .109)-and  its  presence  does  not 
change any of  the other effects substantially. As in the nonlinear model, 
the results are sensitive to the specification of  the dependent variable. 
Columns 3 and 4 show that calculated wages give wrong-signed estimates 
of  e and depend importantly on unanticipated unemployment. This is 
consistent with the conclusions for calculated wages shown in table 4.3. 
Finally,  we  consider  the implied  wage  payments  for  UI  benefits. 
According to equation  10 and definition 19, the appropriate price is 
yCERTEG(y). This price implies that wages fall by exactly the expected 
UI benefits in percentage terms. Table 4.5 shows the annual lower and 
upper 90 percent confidence bounds for the implicit UI price based on 
table 4.3, column 1,  and data for CERTEQG  found in table 4.A. 1. It also 
shows the unconditional sample average UI benefits as a percentage of 
labor earnings. As we noted above, the estimated y is too large to reflect 
the UI replacement  rate  parameter. Nevertheless,  the implied wage 
payments are quite close to the observed unconditional averages con- 162  John M. Abowd and Orley Ashenfelter 
Table 4.5  Annual Average UI Benefits Compared with Benefit Expectatiomi 
Implied by Estimates of y 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  Overall 
~~  ~~~ 
Lower bound (%)"  2.30  3.18  1.97  2.75  3.45  3.62  2.87 
Upper bound (%)"  4.78  6.62  4.11  5.72  7.17  7.53  5.97 
Observedaverage  (%)b  1.06  2.47  .72  1.10  1.58  2.38  1.54 
"Lower and upper bounds of  90% confidence interval computed using 4  =  2.486 (table 4.3, 
column 1) and standard error of  y = ,530. Values of  CERTEQG are in table 4.A.1. 
bAnnual  average  UI  benefits  expressed  as  a  percentage  of  total  labor  earnings 
(EARN +benefits) for the whole sample (MCOMPRAT.DUNEM). 
sidering the fact that the actual UI benefits were not ever used in the 
analysis leading to the estimates in table 4.3. Furthermore, an estimated 
y  of about 1  would give values for the implicit price of UI which are fully 
consistent with the observed percentages. This is, essentially, the value of 
y produced by the estimation technique used in table 4.4.%  It is reason- 
able to conclude that our high estimates of  y give an approximate con- 
sistency with the competitive requirement that  the wage in  the con- 
strained job should fall by the expected UI benefit level. 
4.3.4  Conclusions 
The empirical analysis supports our major theoretical points.  Esti- 
mated compensating differentials range from less than one percent in 
industries where the workers experience little anticipated unemployment 
to over fourteen percent in industries which experience substantial antici- 
pated unemployment and unemployment risk. We find the implied esti- 
mate of the compensated labor supply elasticity is around .W,  which is 
consistent with the prevailing evidence on this parameter. Our estimate 
of a relative risk aversion parameter of 14  is high, but, when coupled with 
the low values of  the coefficient of  variation for unemployment,  the 
implied risk premium is modest. Finally, we present some evidence that 
the  implicit price of UI implied by our model is somewhat large under one 
estimation method and approximately equal to the expected UI benefits 
under the alternative estimation method. 163  Unemployment, Layoffs, and Wage Differentials 
Appendix 
Table 4.A.1  contains variable definitions and summary statistics for all 
variables used in the  analysis. All  data manipulations and estimation 
were performed using the Statistical Analysis System (1979 version). Table 4.A.1  Definitions and Means for All Variables Used in  the Empirical 
Analysis (Standard deviations in parentheses) 



















Reported wage in current $/hr for main job 
Natural logarithm of reported wage 
Reported total labor income in current $ 
Natural logarithm of  EARN/HACT 
Reported average hours per week x reported weeks worked 
(thousands of  hours) 
HACT plus hours unemployed and hours on  strike (thousands 
of  hours) 
HOPT-H  ACT 
Equals 1 if DSCRP>O,  equals 0 otherwise 
Predicted probability of  layoff spell 
Equals DSCRP if  DSCRP >  0, missing otherwise (Summary 
statistics are conditional sample means and standard deviations) 
Predicted unemployment using the formula in the text 
Predicted variance of  unemployment using the formula in the 
text 
HOPT-EXPDURAT 
Industry average unemployment benefits received as a 
percentage of  lost labor earnings 
HBAR + MCOMPRAT x EXPDURAT (Note: in table 4.3 
HEFF is evaluated at the estimate of  7,  not at MCOMPRAT) 
-  EXPDURATMEFF (expected percentage unemployment, 
defined as the negative of  the theoretical quantity) 
.5(EXPDURAT2)/(HOP" x HEFF) (Half of  squared expected 
percentage unemployment. Table entries x 
.5 VARDURAT/(HBAR x HEFF) (Half of  the squared 
coefficient of  variation of  unemployment duration. Table 
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(5.528) Table 4.A.1  (continued) 
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Years of  school (SCHCLASl< 12, SCHCLAS2 = 12, 
SCHCLAS3 >  12 and/or S <  16, SCHCLAS4 >  16) 
Years of  actual labor force experience 
Years employed with the same employer 
Equals 1 if  covered by a collective bargaining agreement (1975) 
or member of  a labor union (197G74) 
(DSCRP-EXPDURAT)/HOPT  (Unanticipated unemployment 
as a proportion  of desired hours) 
Lagged values of  individual DSCRP; 1, 2, 3 years, 
respectively (Means only shown. Overall standard 
deviation = ,130) 
Lagged values of  industry average DSCRP; 1, 2, 3 years, 
respectively 
Lagged values of  overall average DSCRP; 1, 2, 3 years, 
respectively 
Aggregates of  the PSID 2-digit industry classification (Sample 
percentages shown) 
All industures not classified 
Metal manufacturing 
Machinery, including electrical, manufacturing 
Motor vehicles, other transportation  equipment 
Other durable manufacturing 
Food and tobacco manufacturing 
Other nondurable  manufacturing 
Construction 
Transportation 
Other public utilities 
Retail, wholesale, other trade 
Repair services 
Business, personal,  amusement services 
Professional, noneducational services 
Educational services 
Government (nonmedical, noneducational) 
manufacturing 1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  Overall 
12.090  12.233  12.228  12.312  12.477  12.711  12.335 
(3.157)  (3.112)  (3.131)  (3.083)  (3.004)  (2.870)  (3.069) 
26.017  25.598  24.696  23.525  22.496  21.534  24.033 
(11.204)  (11.207)  (11.502)  (11.024)  (11.396)  (11.580)  (11.429) 
9.416  10.250  9.569  9.389  8.862  8.473  9.335 
(8.540)  (8.990)  (8.564)  (8.728)  (8.702)  (9.140)  (8.791) 
,356  .330  ,325  .299  ,297  ,286  .317 
,0049  -.0041  -.0017  -.0025  -.0007  ,0083  .0007 
(.0591)  (.0616)  (.0513)  (.0535)  (.0652)  (.0879)  (.0642) 
,019  ,042  ,031  ,025  ,029  ,042  ,031 
,026  .019  .041  ,036  ,030  ,028  ,029 
.024  .027  ,023  ,045  .049  ,043  ,035 
Same as above 
Same as above 
10.64  10.53  12.68  11.98  10.57 
4.17  3.85  3.48  4.35  4.34 
6.61  8.17  6.71  8.86  8.52 
7.26  6.52  5.80  4.10  4.83 
6.61  6.13  5.80  5.33  5.00 
2.44  3.06  2.57  3.45  3.28 
6.11  6.44  6.88  6.15  6.06 
9.63  9.90  8.37  8.78  8.52 
5.20  5.18  5.05  5.09  5.41 
4.17  4.87  4.14  3.94  3.93 
12.80  12.49  12.84  12.88  12.86 
2.16  1.81  2.90  3.12  3.03 
5.32  4.71  4.31  4.68  5.16 
4.10  3.77  3.98  3.36  4.10 
6.25  6.83  7.12  6.32  5.98 
6.61  5.73  7.37  7.63  8.44 
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Notes 
1. See Mortensen (1970) and Lucas and Rapping (1969) for examples of  unemployment 
as an optimal labor supply strategy. 
2. See Malinvaud (1977) and Ashenfelter (1980) for examples of unemployment viewed 
as a constraint on labor supply behavior. 
3. See especially Rosen (1978 1974). Lewis (1969) provides an early theoretical analysis 
of  the problem of  joint worker-employer determination of  work hours. 
4.  Other termsof employment may vary in order to force equality between V* and V. For 
example, a lump sum payment could be made to the worker or the fringe benefit package 
could be altered. We assume that the fu!1  adjustment occurs in wage rates. 
5. In figure 4.1, V* depends only on h since w,  p. and y are being held constant. 
6. This condition of equilibrium follows from the same type of  argument as Feldstein 
(1978 1976) uses in analyzing the effects of the unemployment insurance system on tempo- 
rary layoffs. 
7. Later we will  use  Taylor  series approximations around  ho to provide  estimating 
formulas. Only the linear term y(ho-h) enters these formulas even if  the UI system is 
modeled in a completely general way. 
8.  The wage w**  is an example of  an implicit contract equilibrium wage in the spirit of 
Azariadis (1975) and Baily (1977). Condition 3'ensures that thecontract w**,f(h;  e), which 
leads to unemployment or underemployment is just as desirable as the full employment 
contract, w,  ho. The firm's production  and demand conditions determine which type of 
contract it will offer. 
9.  It is easier to derive the relevant approximations using the minimum expenditure 
function rather than the indirect utility function when there are no risk problems. Of course, 
we will use the utility function when we consider risk. 
10. Fortheappropriatevalueof v=V(w,p,y),h'(w,p,  v)=ho(w,p,y). Hence, the UI 
system in equation 6' is identical to the system underlying 1'. 
11. The  reader is reminded  that the-unemployment rate used  here is the  expected 
personal  unemployment  rate u = (ho -  h)/ho  and not  the economy-wide unemployment 
rate. 
12. The reader is referred to Abowd and Ashenfelter (1979) for the derivation of  this 
result. The relative risk aversion function used here is a straightforward extension of  the 
concept in Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1970). 
13. Duncan  and Stafford  (1980) consider simultaneous determination  of  wages and 
compensating differentials in the context of  union wages and working conditions. In this 
model, personal heterogeneity is assumed to influence the size of  the required compensa- 
tion. 
14.  Rosen (1974) works an example. 
15.  See Survey Research Center (1972a) for a description of the methods and sampling 
frame. See Survey Research Center (1972b 1973 1974 1975 1976) for the relevant question- 
naires and variable definitions. 
16. All annual hours variables, including DSCRP, are defined in thousands of  hours. 
17. Sherwin  Rosen provided  some valuable  comments concerning  the  usefulness of 
identifying industry patterns when forecasting the hours of  work constraint. 
18. The average shown is unconditional so that it can be compared with EXPDURAT 
and VARDURAT. The data for DUNEM and the industry proportions in table 4.A.1  can 
be used to calculate the conditional average duration. 
19. EXPDURAT and VARDURAT are not independent since TS and T[(  1 -  m)S2 + 4'1 
will, in general, be correlated when m, 6, and 4 all depend on zz,.  The sample correlation 
coefficient is .91. 
20.  PSID reports a variable: income from unemployment and workmen's compensation. 
The sample replacement rates were calculated as industry by year averages of the ratio of 169  Unemployment, Layoffs, and Wage Differentials 
this UI income variable to the implied lost earnings (WAGE’DSCRP)  of  the head. The 
average is taken only over nonzero values of  DSCRP. 
21.  The use of  last year’s wage is intended to remove a person effect from the nonlinear 
regression. We do  not mean to imply any dynamics. As is well known, a fixed person effect 
cannot be consistently estimated in a nonlinear regression model by  the usual deviation 
from time average method. 
22.  Ken Wolpin suggested this variation. 
23. The method minimizes the posterior expected loss from a Bayesian viewpoint and 
improves the mean squared estimate error from the sampling theory viewpoint. The method 
is designed for problems where the parameter of  interest is the inverse of  the estimated 
parameter. 
24.  Ashenfelter and Heckman (1974) estimated the ninety percent confidence interval 
for the compensated labor supply elasticity at .06  (?  .05) at their sample means in their table 
1. Keeley, et al. (1978a b) estimated the ninety percent confidence interval at .23 (5.17)  at 
our sample means using their table 2. 
25.  See Azariadis (1975) and, especially, Baily (1974) for a discussion of  the differential 
risk aversion hypothesis. 
26.  We have produced summary measures based exclusively on table 4.3,  column 1,  since 
it is, overall, the most reasonable equation. The ninety percent confidence interval for the 
UI price implied by the estimate in table 4.4, column 1, is 2.14 percent (2  1.21%) which 
includes all the observed values reported in table 4.5. We should also note, however, that 
Feldstein (1978) reports that reported UI benefits received by CPS respondents understate 
the aggregate payments by fifty percent. This supports our estimate of y in table 4.3, column 
1, summarized in table 4.5. 
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1978): 127-58. 5  Structural and Reduced 
Form Approaches to  Analyzing 
Unemployment Durations 
Nicholas M. Kiefer and George R. Neumann 
5.1  Introduction 
Workers with low current earnings comprise two types of individuals: 
those whose personal characteristics lead to their being permanently in 
the low-wage state, and those who are, owing to some exogenous event, 
only transitorily in the low-wage state. This distinction is recognized 
implicitly in public policies designed to aid such workers. Workers who 
are viewed as “permanent”  low wage earners are provided programs 
which attempt to alter their personal characteristics-e.g., manpower 
training programs. For those workers viewed as only transitorily in the 
low earning state, services  provided tend to be short-term income mainte- 
nance, e.g., unemployment insurance following losses in jobs and Work- 
men’s Compensation following debilitating work injuries. The distinction 
between permanent and transitory is not rigid, however, since not all 
workers recover from a transitory shock such as the loss of  a high-wage 
job. Similarly, some workers with characteristics normally associated 
with permanent low wage earnings escape to the high-wage sector. The 
size of  the pool of  low wage at any time depends then upon the magni- 
tudes of these inflows and outflows. Although economists cannot claim to 
understand fully how public programs affect all movements between the 
two states, a clearer picture is emerging on the effects of  manpower 
training programs and the movement out of  the low-earnings state. 
Our understanding of  the effect of  public programs on the transition 
into the low-earnings state is much less precise, however, partially be- 
cause we have only a limited knowledge of  the adjustments individuals 
Nicholas M. Kiefer is Associate Professor of Economics, Cornell University. 
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make to such events as job loss. Why is it, for example, that one indi- 
vidual will become reemployed in a short time with only minimal loss of 
earnings while another individual with a similar earnings history finds a 
new job only after a considerable period of time and then experiences a 
substantial decline in earnings? Is this merely an example of “bad luck,” 
or does it indicate a systematic means whereby a transitory event leads 
some workers into permanent low-wage status? Although much has been 
written on the job search behavior of  individuals, comparatively little 
empirical evidence exists to shed light on why some individuals succeed 
and others fail. Moreover, the evidence that does exist is generally of 
little use for exploring questions about the efficacy of  alternative labor 
market  programs.  This latter problem  arises because customary ap- 
proaches of analyzing the outcome of the job search process-that  is, the 
wage  offer  accepted  and the length  of  time  required  to obtain  it- 
produce, at best, a reduced form relationship which confounds differ- 
ences in market opportunities with differences in personal characteris- 
tics. Consequently, the true effect of  a particular program is difficult to 
determine. For the purposes of  policy analysis, an identification of  the 
underlying structural relationship is necessary if  one desires to measure 
the effects of  programs designed to affect the job search process. 
In this paper we consider the effects of  two alternative labor market 
programs designed to smooth the transition from the unemployed state: a 
modified version of  regular unemployment insurance and a wage subsidy 
program. In the data used in this study, one of  these programs-the 
modified  unemployment  insurance-actually  operated,  and  we  can 
therefore consider variations in policy parameters. The alternative wage 
subsidy program was not available to any individuals, but it has attracted 
some attention recently as a means of reducing unemployment. While no 
direct evidence-that  is, of  the experiences of  treatment and control 
groups-is  available, we show that knowledge of  the structural para- 
meters-but  not the reduced form parameters-is  sufficient to identify 
the effects of  this type  of  program.  In examining the  effects of  the 
different programs, we contrast the policy implications that flow from the 
reduced form estimates and the structural estimates. These differences 
provide a useful insight into the gains obtainable from a precise model 
specification. 
5.2  Outcomes of the Job Search Process 
Analysis of  the effects of unemployment has focused on the length of 
time required to find employment, and the resulting wage obtained; in 
particular, the analysis has focused on measuring the effects of programs 
such as unemployment insurance (UI) on the outcome of the job search 173  Structural  and Reduced Form Approaches  to Unemployment Durations 
process. The theory motivating this analysis is given by the well-known 
papers by Mortensen (1970) and McCall (1970) on search behavior. To 
state this theory somewhat loosely, empirical studies proceed from the 
observation that anything which lowers the cost of  search increases an 
individual’s reservation wage and thereby leads to both longer durations 
of unemployment and higher wages upon reemployment. 
Empirical efforts to measure the relationship between duration and 
wage change have taken two directions. The first approach, typified by 
Classen (1977) and Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976), treats the outcomes of 
the job search process as jointly determined and attempts to estimate a 
reduced form system. The specific model is: 
(la)  Di=X’liB  +  Eli 
(1b)  Wi =  X2iBi +  E2i 
where Di is the number of weeks of unemployment and Wi  is reemploy- 
ment wage. Parameters of the UI system, i.e., the replacement rate, are 
included in X,  and X,, and their coefficients are interpreted as the net 
effects of  the UI system on the job search process. 
An alternative approach has been taken in Kiefer and Neumann (1978 
1979a b). In this approach the job search process is viewed as a selection 
problem following Heckman (1979). Individuals accept employment if 
and only if  the market wage offer exceeds their reservation wage. Ex- 
pected wages are then just a drawing from a truncated distribution, with 
the point of  truncation depending upon the reservation wage, and the 
expected duration of  unemployment is distributed geometrically about 
the inverse of  the per period probability of  finding an acceptable job 
offer.’ A difficulty encountered in the approach is that reservation wages 
are not observable; they must be inferred from the observed choices of 
individuals. This problem, which motivated the use of  a reduced form 
solution in other papers, can be solved in the following manner (see also 
Kiefer and Neumann 1979b). 
Assume that the wage offer distribution facing the. ith individual is: 
In  $+  XiB  +fi + 57 
(2)  5:-i.i.d.  N(0, 4  vt 
where Xi represents all measured characteristics of  an individual (age, 
education, labor market characteristics, etc.), fi represents all unmea- 
sured characteristics, which are assumed known by the individual and 
potential employers, and  I$‘  is a random error term representing  the 
“pure” amount of  wage variability. The characterization in (2) implies 
that the wage offer distribution is stationary, an assumption which seems 
reasonable in light of  the span of  time covered by  a typical spell of 174  Nicholas M. Kiefer and George R. Neumann 
unemployment, and that observed wages have two sources of variation- 
systematic, but unmeasured, differences in “ability” fi, and randomness 
in the wage offer process, represented by  I$. 
Facing (2), an optimal strategy is to select a reservation wage with the 
property that offers which match or exceed this critical value are accepted 
and those that fall short are rejected. The reservation wage can be shown 
to be of  the form: 
(3)  Ct=g[qe),  m,  0, tl 
where F(#)  is the distribution of  wage offers, m is the direct cost of 
search, 0  is  the  discount  factor, and  t represents the  effect of  state 
dependence-that  is, reservation wages may systematically  vary with the 
length of time searching. Using results from Kiefer and Neumann (1979a 
b), a first-order Taylor expansion of  (3) can be shown to yield 
(3’) 
where ki  is defined as 
Tit =  ki(XriB  +fi) + Zi(t)  * y 
Note that there is no stochastic element in (3’); individuals who search 
optimally in this model choose a strategy-a  reservation price-which  is 
not  random, although it may vary over time as reflected in the time 
subscript on 2, i.e., in response to time-dependent factors which directly 
affect the costs of search. 
Individuals accept employment if  and only if the wage offer exceeds the 
reservation wage. Using (2) and (3’), the employment condition is that 
(4)  sj(t)=(l-kk,)(X~B+fi)-Zi(t)r>  -EP 
defining si(t)  = -  [(l -  ki)(X;B  +fi) -  Zi(t)y]/a.  The probability of  find- 
ing a job in any period CY is, for a given individual, 
(5)  .[si(t)lfi]=Pr(wp>wTIfi)=  l-@[si(t)lfi] 
where @ is the standard normal distribution function. The statement in 
(5) is the probability of  an individual’s finding a job in period t, condi- 
tional on his unmeasured abilityfi. Although by definition we do not have 
measures off,, an implication of the optional choice of a reservation wage 
is that randomness in wage offers should be independent offi. Hence the 
unconditional probability of  finding an acceptable job offer is 
30 
Cx[Si(t)] = J  [  1 -  @(Si  lfi)]d@ - 
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Using (6) and results from conditional normal theory, the probability of 
observing a particular outcome-that  is, a wage  w?,  and a length of 
unemployment Dris  given by 
Pr(wp, Di)  =  7  ((n @[si(t)  Ifil). -  +(Ei)  1 
UO  (7)  --m 
as t goes from 1  to Di -  1  and d+vi/uF)  goes from -  w to m. Subject to 
identification criteria discussed in Kiefer and Neumann (1979a b), all 
parameters in  equation  7  can  be  estimated  by  maximum  likelihood 
methods.* In particular one can identify B,  y, a:  (the pure variation in 
wage offers), and u;  (the variation in unmeasured ability). 
The issues which arise in estimating the model described above are 
discussed at length elsewhere (see Kiefer and Neumann 1979b). For the 
present  purposes it is sufficient to note that two structural equations 
relating  unemployment and reemployment  earnings are embedded in 
(7). The expected length of search for a randomly chosen individual is 
given by: 
[l -  @(Si(j)  lfi] *j  d@ 0  (9 
The expected reemployment wage is somewhat more cumbersome to 
derive. Conditional on  fi, and conditional on the length of search being 
Dj,  expected reemployment earnings are: 
(9)  E(wplfi, Di)=X~B+fi+u,h[s(D)lfi] 
where 
If  the reservation wage were constant, i.e., s did not vary with D,  then 
unconditional expected earnings would be given by 
(:  j 
m 
E(@) =J  E(w,Ifi, D)d@ - 
-ca 
P 
=X,'B  + u0 J  h(si Ifi)d@ 
--m 
When reservation wages vary with search time, the second term on the 176  Nicholas M. Kiefer and George R. Neumann 
right-hand side on (10) must be modified to allow for differences in the 
probability of receiving an acceptable offer in a given period. Define the 
probability that an acceptable offer is received in period j  as: 
gjo') = (5  e=  l@[s(e)  1  lfi,).  1 -  @[so') lfi] 
The unconditional expected reemployment wage is then: 
Equations 8 and 12 can be thought of as the structural analogues to what 
we have termed the reduced form solutions of  (la) and (2b). In view of 
the differences between the reduced form and structural approaches it is 
useful to examine the merits of each. Two issues are of particular impor- 
tance: interpreting changes in policy variables such as UI benefits, and 
drawing inferences  from incomplete  samples (see Johnson  and Kotz 
1972; Heckman, in press). 
The reduced form approach has one particular advantage-it  is simple 
and cheap to estimate. If  reservation wages are constant, the estimated 
coefficients have a potential interpretation as the coefficients  of  a Taylor 
expansion of  the inverse of  (6) for the duration equation [i.e., E(D) 
= l/a(si)],  and as 
for the earnings equation. In this case, if  both forms of  the job search 
model were estimated on a complete sample, the only difference that 
should arise would be due to the inherent nonlinearity of  the structural 
duration equation. If  reservation wages vary over time as well as across 
individuals, then the correspondence between the two approaches is less 
obvious. Policies which affect the duration of  unemployment also affect 
the distribution of  accepted wages since the point of  truncation varies 
with duration. 
The use of a reduced form approach also results in problems of  inter- 
pretation when certain types of  policy simulations are attempted. For 
example, if  a wage subsidy of, say, ten percent were given to all indi- 
viduals in the sample, it would affect both duration and reemployment 
earnings, although  in  opposite ways.  In the absence of  a controlled 
experiment-where  individuals were randomly assigned to the group 
receiving the subsidy-it  is difficult to see how one could simulate this 
effect using a reduced form model. The problem is one of identification: 177  Structural  and Reduced Form Approaches to Unemployment Durations 
the moments of  the wage distribution  do not enter explicitly into the 
reduced form approach. If reservation wages are constant, this problem 
may not be serious because of  the potential interpretation of  the reduced 
form coefficients noted above. In the more general case, however, it is 
not possible to infer the results of such an experiment from the reduced 
form estimates. 
Perhaps the greatest difference between the two approaches arises 
when information is available only for an incomplete sample. For exam- 
ple, it is frequently the case that a “follow-up” survey is performed after 
some event has occurred. At  the time of  the survey some individuals will 
have completed their job search, but some will not. Those who have not 
found employment will  tend  to have  low  expected  market  earnings, 
relative to their reservation wage-hence  the long period of  unemploy- 
ment. Since neither of  the dependent variables is observed, the observa- 
tions are usually excluded from the analy~is.~  For well-known reasons this 
is likely to result in biased estimates. Apart from the question of  bias, 
there is the question of  interpreting the results of  any simulation exercise 
since the composition of  an incomplete sample is not likely to be invariant 
under changes in policy. Consider, for example, the effect of  a shift in the 
mean  of  the wage  offer  distribution.  Search theory implies  that the 
expected wage should increase, and expected duration decrease, for all 
individuals. In an incomplete sample, the effect of  such a policy would be 
that some individuals who previously had not found employment would 
become employed and hence would be included in the sample. If  these 
individuals on average had higher durations of unemployment and lower 
expected earnings, then observed average wages would fall and duration 
increase, even in a carefully controlled experiment. 
The importance of this effect will depend upon the location of  reserva- 
tion wages along the distribution of  wage offers. If reservation wages are 
high,  relative  to the mean of  the wage offer distribution, and if  the 
distribution of offers has small variance, even a small shift in the mean 
may produce a significant change in unemployment patterns. 
In noting these differences, we have only pointed out the potential 
problems which may exist; the severity of  these problems-that  is, the 
extent to which they lead to different policy implications-is  ultimately 
an empirical matter. In the following section, we examine the simulated 
responses of  a group of  individuals to two plans which affect their unem- 
ployment activities. 
5.3  Simulating Job Search Behavior: 
The Effects of A Wage Subsidy Plan 
In this section we apply the models discussed above to a sample of 
unemployed male workers. This particular sample was generated from a 178  Nicholas M. Kiefer and George R. Neumann 
survey of  trade-displaced workers conducted by  the Institute for Re- 
search on Human Resources of  the Pennsylvania State University. A 
complete description of the data source is contained in Neumann (1978). 
Several features make this group particularly appropriate for discussions 
about low-wage workers. The sample is constructed solely of individuals 
who were permanently separated from employment-in  most cases be- 
cause the entire plant  shut  down. Thus we  observe only job  search 
behavior and do not have to be concerned with responses to anticipated, 
temporary layoffs. Moreover, the nature of  the shock conforms to the 
idea of an exogenous shock to which some individuals adjust reasonably 
well, and others adjust only with great difficulty. Although many of these 
individuals would not have been considered low-wage workers prior to 
displacement, the average loss in weekly earnings upon reemployment 
was over twenty-five percent: consequently, most would be considered 
low-wage earners afterward. Summary statistics on this sample are con- 
tained in table 5.1. 
Estimates of  the reduced form equations for duration and reemploy- 
ment earnings are presented in table 5.2, and the structural estimates of 
reemployment  earnings (wage offers) and reservation wages are con- 
tained in table 5.3. Although we will not dwell on the precision of  the 
estimates, we do note that the explanatory power of  the OLS regression 
of  unemployment  duration is exceedingly small; this appears to be a 
common finding (see, e.g., Ehrenberg and Oaxaca 1976; Classen 1977). 
Both approaches indicate an effect of UI benefits on the outcome of the 
job search process. The reduced form estimates imply that a ten percent 
increase in the replacement rate-equivalent here to an average increase 
of $14.9 per week in UI benefitewould lead to an increase in duration of 
about one-half week (.0314 x 14.9), and an increase in unemployment 
earnings of  0.60 percent. The effects of  increased UI benefits are ap- 
parent in column 2, but the numerical values of the increases in duration 
and reemployment earnings depend upon the position of the reservation 
Table 5.1  Sample Characteristics of Male Workers 
Mean  Maximum  Minimum 
Education (years) 
No. of  dependents 
Percent married 
Percent union members 
Local unemployment rate at layoff (%) 
Age 
Unemployment benefits per week ($1967) 
Maximum  benefit period (weeks) 
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Table 5.2  Reduced Form Estimates of Duration and Reemployment 
Wage Equation 
Reemployment 
Duration  Earnings 


































































wage in the wage offer distribution. We calculate these effects in the 
simulation reported below. 
Before examining the simulation results it is useful to consider one 
feature of  the job search process. Both casual empirical evidence and 
some previous studies (e.g., Neumann 1978) suggest that losses due to 
unemployment are greatest for the long-term unemployed. Although a 
higher reservation wage leads to higher expected reemployment and a 
greater length of  unemployment for any individual ex ante, when one 
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aspect  is  swamped by  variations  in  individual  characteristics  and by 
random errors in the process. In the present context this phenomenon is 
likely to be concentrated among the group of workers who had not found 
employment by  the survey date. Since their behavior  is of  particular 
interest in any discussion of  low-income workers we present simulation 
results separately for this group. 
The simulated effects of  changing UI benefits in steps of  five percent on 
duration of unemployment and the percentage change in reemployment 
earnings are presented in table 5.4. Panels A and B contain the estimates 
from the reduced form model (equations la  and lb)  for the total sample 
and for those workers who remained unemployed for at least sixty-five 
weeks; panels C and D contain the equivalent estimates for the structural 
model (equations 8 and 12). The estimates in table 5.4 show two pro- 
nounced patterns. Looking across each panel, we see that, for this sample 
at least, changes in UI benefit levels would have almost negligible effects. 
Increasing  UI benefits  by  twenty  percent-which  for  this  sample  is 
equivalent  to raising the average replacement rate by  8.4 percentage 
points (from 42.1 percent to 50.5 percent)-would  raise reemployment 
earnings by only about .5 percent and increase the duration of unemploy- 
ment by about one-half week. These are quite modest effects when one 
considers  that the average reemployed  worker  in  this sample had  a 
decline in real weekly earnings of  26.7 percent and spent 39.1 weeks 
unemployed.  It is  interesting to note  that although estimates of  the 
precise  effect of  changing UI benefits  would  differ depending upon 
whether one used the reduced form or structural model, the conclusions 
to be drawn from the evidence would not. 
Looking  down the columns  of  table  5.4, we  observe  a  somewhat 
different picture of  the differences between the  two approaches to model- 
ing the job search process. Comparison of panels A and B would seem to 
indicate that there is little difference between those who had not become 
employed within 65 weeks and those who had; panels C and D indicate 
the contrary. The expected duration of unemployment was estimated to 
be 34.7 weeks for those who became employed within 65 weeks, and 47.2 
weeks  for those  who had  not  become  employed  by  65 weeks.  This 
amounts  to about a seven-week difference in expected duration of  unem- 
ployment between the two groups. In one sense, this difference between 
the two models can be considered a contrived one, since the structural 
model takes into account information on the characteristics and, par- 
tially, the job search outcomes, of  the group of  workers who had not 
found  jobs within  65  weeks.4 But this  is precisely  the purpose  of  a 
structural model, and the differences observed in table 5.4  represent the 
basis  for using  such  an approach  to design  policies  to smooth labor 
market transitions. Under the reduced form approach, the similarity of 
the estimated duration and wage changes would lead one to conclude that 182  Nicholas M. Kiefer and George R. Neumann 
Table 5.4  Structural and Reduced Form Simulations of  the Effect of 
Alternative Levels of  UI Benefits 
% A in UI Benefits 
0.0  5.0  10.0  15.0  20.0 
Duration (weeks) 
% A in earnings 
Duration (weeks) 
% A in earnings 
Duration (weeks) 
% A in earnings 
Duration (weeks) 
% A in earnings 
Reduced Form Estimates 
A. Total Sample 
39.31  39.41  39.51 
0.0  0.13  0.25 
B. Unemployed after 65 weeks 
39.62  39.73  39.83 
0.0  0.13  ,025 
Structural Estimates 
C. Total sample 
43.10  43.41  43.67 
0.0  0.17  0.29 
D. Unemployed after 65 weeks 
47.21  47.36  47.50 

















the two groups are essentially the same; hence it must be random in- 
fluence-luck-which  determine whom the labor market assigns to each 
group. The structural approach, on the other hand, implies that there are 
real differences between the two groups and thus, at least in principle, 
allows the possibility of  predicting in advance what types of  individuals 
are likely to be most affected by unexpected job loss. 
The results of  this simulation raise strong doubts about the ability of 
what is essentially an income maintenance program to have a significant 
impact on the reemployment experience of  displaced workers. Although 
the sample used is unique, and certainly not representative of all unem- 
ployed workers, our results, both the reduced form and structural ver- 
sions, are not significantly at odds with the findings of  others which are 
based solely on a reduced form approach. While it is difficult to general- 
ize from a sample of one, there is at least the suggestion that returns from 
more precise modeling of  the job search process may be important for 
policy purposes. 
Although predicting which types of  individuals will be most adversely 
affected by job termination is one possible gain to a structural approach, 
a more important gain is likely to be in terms of the number of  difference 
policy options which can be considered. As an example, we consider the 
option of a wage subsidy program. The basic idea of  a wage subsidy is to 
shift the distribution of  wage offers facing individuals, thereby making 
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obvious way to incorporate such effects, except possibly through a con- 
trolled experiment. A structural approach allows for a direct interpreta- 
tion, however, since the shift in the wage offer distribution affects an 
individual’s expected  earnings both  directly-i.e.,  through  XiB-and 
indirectly through its effects on reservation wages. 
In table 5.5 we present the results of a simulation exercise with varying 
amounts of wage subsidy. Because these simulations, as in the case of the 
UI subsidy, are partial equilibrium in nature, the results are sensitive to 
the assumed stability of the wage offer distribution. In the present case, 
this amounts to assuming that a wage subsidy program will not affect the 
distribution of  wage offers part from the mean shift, i.e., no “extra” 
effects due to a substitution of labor for capital. For small programs this 
assumption seems tenable. 
The issue also arises of how accurately this shift in the distribution is 
perceived by  individuals. If  it is fully perceived, then reservation wages 
rise by  a fraction da  +  0 of  the increase in the mean. This increase in 
reservation wages leads to lengthier search, and, consequently, the effect 
on duration of unemployment is lessened. Since some wage subsidy plans 
(e.g., jobs credit) work in a manner that may not be obvious to indi- 
viduals, we  present estimates of  the effect on duration assuming full 
reservation  wage change (panels A and B), and no reservation wage 
change (panel C). 
In contrast to a UI subsidy, a direct wage subsidy appears to have quite 
significant effects on the job search process. From panels A and B we 
observe that a twenty percent wage subsidy would lead to an increase in 
reemployment earnings of  about nineteen percent, and a reduction of 
unemployment  duration of  about a week, if  the shift in  the mean is 
Table 5.5  Structural Simulations of the Effect of a Wage Subsidy Program 
% A in Mean Wage Offer 
0.0  5.0  10.0  15.0  20.0 
A. Total Sample 
Duration (weeks)  43.10  42.87  42.51  42.23  42.06 
% A in earnings  0.0  4.91  9.84  14.72  19.6 
B. Unemployed over 65 weeks 
Duration (weeks)  47.21  47.03  46.74  46.39  46.12 
%A in earnings  0.0  4.87  9.78  14.68  19.2 
C. Duration of Unemployment with 
Incomplete Knowledge (weeks) 
Total sample  43.10  41.64  40.02  38.75  37.29 
Unemployed over 
65 weeks  47.21  45.88  44.16  42.82  41.28 184  Nicholas M. Kiefer and George R. Neumann 
completely perceived. The effect of the change in reservation wages can 
be seen clearly in panel C: if  reservation wages did not adjust, expected 
unemployment duration would decrease by  six weeks instead of  one. 
5.4  Conclusion 
This paper has focused on two points-the  inferences which can be 
obtained from structural versus reduced form analysis of the outcome of 
the job search process, and the effects of two subsidy programs on the job 
search process. In regard to the former topic, it is clear that a structural 
model permits a wider range of  possible questions. In particular, it is 
possible to consider, ex ante, what the likely experience of  a given cohort 
of  job searchers will be, and, in principle, to tailor different types of 
programs to ease their labor market transitions. 
The comparison of  a UI subsidy with a wage subsidy revealed signifi- 
cant differences. Higher levels of UI payments led, as expected, to both 
longer durations of  unemployment and higher reemployment earnings. 
Both  effects were  quite  small,  however,  and,  at  least for low-wage 
workers similar to the individuals in this sample, there is little reason to 
believe that programs which emphasize income maintenance are likely to 
have much impact on the types of  jobs obtained. By contrast, a wage 
subsidy program appears to have a significant effect on reemployment 
earnings, and also to lead to a moderate decline in duration. This is a 
one-blade-of-the-scissors result of course, and it is subject to criticism on 
those grounds. Nonetheless, for relatively small programs, the possibili- 
ties appear to be fruitful. 
Notes 
1. This result holds only for the case of  constant reservation wages. The correct distribu- 
tion of  durations for the general use is given in equation (7) below. 
2. The identification criteria amount to the following: some variable(s) must affect wage 
offers but must not directly affect reservation wages. Indirect effects+.g.,  through the 
moments of  the wage offer function-are  permissible, indeed necessary. 
3. There are other reasons  why  truncation  could  occur.  Using state UI records on 
compensated unemployment results in a truncation of those with very short durations-less 
than  the waiting  period-and  those  with  long durations-those  whose unemployment 
exceeds the maximum duration period. 
4.  The estimates in the reduced form approach for the sample of workers not employed in 
sixty-five weeks are constructed simply by using the observed characteristics of  the indi- 
vidual and the coefficients estimated from the sample of  employed. No attempt is made to 
adjust the constant term such that the expected value of, say, duration reflects the obvious 
fact that the observed period of unemployment was greater than 65 weeks. 185  Structural and Reduced Form Approaches to Unemployment Durations 
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